The Real Waste Is Not Consultation. It is secrecy.

Why the 2026 CRC must demand the FELRC report — and why the government must release it.

Author’s note: Professor Wadan Narsey served as a part-time Commissioner on the 2025 Fiji Electoral Law Reform Commission (FELRC) and is a former Professor of Economics at the University of the South Pacific. The views expressed in this piece are his own and do not necessarily represent those of his colleagues on the Commission or the Commission as a body. Where the Commission’s work is drawn upon, this is noted explicitly. Where claims rest on a single source or are unverifiable, this is stated. This article has been independently edited and published by the Fiji Political Review.

My Argument — and the Bigger Problem Behind It

My April 2026 article in the Fiji Times was framed, on its surface, as an argument about saving taxpayers’ money. The recommendation — that the 2026 Constitution Review Commission (CRC) should avoid re-running community consultations on electoral reform already covered by the 2025 Fiji Electoral Law Reform Commission (FELRC) — is a matter of fiscal prudence, and it stands. But the more important issue this article exposes is not one of cost. It is one of the disclosure processes.

Fiji has already paid for a substantial review of its electoral laws. The Final Report of the Fiji Law Reform Commission Electoral Law Review 2025, titled An Electoral System FOR the People FROM the People, was formally presented to Acting Attorney-General Siromi Turaga on 8 July 2025. The review involved a four-month nationwide consultation across all four divisions and Rotuma, conducted with support from the Ministry of Justice, Electoral Commission, Ministry of Women, and the Fijian Elections Office, among others. The FLRC stated publicly that the report 'will be made publicly available in due course.' It has not been released.

That is the real problem. Not that the 2026 CRC may consult too widely, but that the country is being asked to trust another consultation process while the findings of the first taxpayer-funded review remain out of sight, nine months after submission. To be direct: this is not a case against democracy or wider consultation. It is a case against procedural duplication without disclosure.

Why the Report Remains Embargoed: A Complicating Factor

There is a complication here that must be acknowledged. The embargo on the FELRC report is not purely a political act of suppression. In November 2025, details of the Commission’s recommendations were disclosed publicly before the government had released the report, which drew a formal warning from the Acting Attorney-General. That explains part of the delay. Whether it justifies withholding the full document from Parliament and the public is a separate question — and a far more difficult one to defend.

I raised this concern publicly in November 2025, more than four months after submission, when the report had not been tabled in Parliament or made public, despite its significance to all political parties, potential independents, and future good governance in Fiji. That concern has only deepened in the months since.

The CRC's Legitimate Mandate

To be fair to the 2026 CRC, it is entitled to say that electoral reform falls within its constitutional remit. Members of the Constitution Review Committee were sworn in by President Ratu Naiqama Lalabalavu at State House on 13 March 2026, and include lawyer Sevuloni Valenitabua as chairman, FNU Vice-Chancellor Professor Unaisi Nabobo-Baba, public policy specialist Merewalesi Nailatikau, legal practitioner Ami Kohli, USP economist Dr Neelesh Gounder, constitutional law practitioner Dr John Fatiaki, and former Fiji Rugby Union chairman Conway Begg.

On the question of electoral reform, CRC Chairman Valenitabua has taken a measured position. He has said that if submissions and consultations demand a change to the electoral system, they may have to recommend that change, but they cannot decide in advance and will wait for the consultations. In principle, that is the correct institutional posture. Fiji should not repeat the pattern of constitutional change by imposition. A review process that affects the electoral system must be publicly defended, publicly explained, and publicly tested.

But that position only strengthens the case for releasing the 2025 FELRC report first. Consultation is not compromised by transparency. It is made legitimate by it.

The Substance of What the FELRC Found

The article is also an attempt to put substance back into the public discussion. The calls for electoral reform were made following the 2022 General Elections and widespread criticism of the electoral legislation framework, which many — including independent observers, academics, and political parties — considered undemocratic, cumbersome, and punitive.

In our consultations, the FELRC team heard recurring public complaints across all four divisions and Rotuma, including:

• Ballot paper design — the current format lists candidates by number only, with no names, photographs, or party symbols, which voters found confusing and alienating.
• Accountability — voters consistently wanted identifiable local MPs accountable to a specific community, rather than MPs elected at a national level.
• Fairness — disproportional outcomes in seat allocation, where candidates with thousands of votes could be excluded while those with far fewer votes entered Parliament.
• Party rules — excessive registration requirements for political parties.
• Process — harsh penalties for minor infractions and over-concentrated powers held by electoral officials.

These complaints are consistent with criticisms aired in Fiji’s media and academic commentary for several years, which lends them credibility. The article also outlines what the Commission recommended as an alternative — a Proportional Open List Constituency System (POLCS) combining 25 local constituencies, 25 reserved seats for women, and 21 national list seats to preserve proportionality. Electoral reform must not remain an abstraction. It is about representation, accountability, accessibility, and trust — and the people of Fiji told us exactly what they want from their electoral system, in their own words and languages.

A Critical Limitation That Must Be Stated Plainly

A real limitation must be stated plainly. Because the Final Report remains embargoed, readers cannot independently verify whether the POLCS model described here represents the settled, collective recommendation of the 2025 Commission, one option among several that was considered, or partly a personal interpretation of what the Commission concluded. My articles state clearly that the views expressed are personal and do not necessarily reflect those of my colleagues on the FELRC. That disclaimer matters.

The public is being asked to evaluate a specific reform proposal without access to the document that would enable proper scrutiny of its reasoning, evidence base, and the alternatives considered and rejected. This limitation in my own position does not weaken the argument for transparency — it makes it more urgent. Release the report. Let people read it and judge for themselves.

The Ethnic Politics Dimension: Important but Unresolved

The proportionality elements of POLCS are partly justified by reference to Fiji’s history of coups and the instability that followed elections in which indigenous Fijian parties did not control government. Prime Minister Rabuka has been openly angling towards an overhaul of the electoral system ahead of general elections expected between August 2026 and February 2027, though any such change requires constitutional amendment.

There is a tension in this argument that should be acknowledged. Political realism about Fiji’s coup history is understandable, and it informs the thinking here. But building an electoral system primarily around ethnic reassurance risks conceding too much to the same anxieties that have repeatedly distorted constitutional development in Fiji. Electoral reform must ultimately be anchored in constitutional principle — equal citizenship, fair representation, accountable government, and rules that can command legitimacy across all communities. This tension is raised without being fully resolved. Any serious public deliberation through the CRC process will need to confront it directly, and the full FELRC report — if released — would help provide the evidential basis for that debate.

The Right Conclusion

The issue is not whether Fiji should consult again on electoral reform. A Supreme Court advisory opinion in 2025 affirmed the lawfulness of the 2013 Constitution while narrowing the supermajority requirements for amending it, making constitutional reform legally and politically viable in ways it had not been previously. Some degree of fresh consultation to validate or update findings may well be warranted within that new constitutional context.

The issue is whether the state can credibly ask the public to speak again while withholding the most important electoral reform document it has already commissioned. The first obligation is straightforward: release the 2025 FELRC report in full. Let the country read it. Let political parties, civil society, lawyers, scholars, and ordinary voters examine what was recommended and why. Then let the CRC build on that public record in an open manner. Anything less invites the reasonable impression that consultation is being managed rather than honoured. Until that changes, the real waste is not consultation. It is the secrecy surrounding a process that the public has already paid for.

Editor's update, 29 April 2026: The Fiji Law Reform Commission provided a response after publication. FLRC Director Ms Raijeli Tuivaga confirmed that the FELRC Final Report was handed to the Acting Attorney-General on 8 July 2025, along with three corresponding Electoral Bills. In accordance with standard FLRC practice, the report will be made publicly available once it has been considered by the Cabinet Sub-Committee, approved by Cabinet, and tabled in Parliament. Ms Tuivaga noted that once a report is handed to the Attorney-General, responsibility for the tabling timetable rests with the Acting AG, the Solicitor-General and the relevant Ministry — not the FLRC. The FLRC also objected to any characterisation of the delay as suppression. The Fiji Political Review acknowledges the FLRC's response and notes that it directs the central question of this article — why a publicly funded electoral reform report has not been tabled in Parliament nine months after submission — squarely to the Acting Attorney-General and Cabinet. Professor Narsey has noted that his article was directed at the Rabuka Government's failure to table the report in Parliament, not at the FLRC's processes, and that the substantive criticisms in his article remain. The Acting Attorney-General has not responded to the Fiji Political Review's request for comment.